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We develop a two-region model where the decentralized provision of spillover 
goods can be financed by means of taxes or user fees. In order to enforce the fees 
regions have to invest in exclusion. We show that a decentralized solution tends to 
be inefficient. There will be over-investment in exclusion and an underprovision 
of the spillover goods compared to a centralized solution. In addition the regions 
have strategic incentives to set user charges. If the regional spillover goods are 
substitutes user fees tend to be inefficiently low, whereas they tend to be 
inefficiently high if the spillover goods are complements. 
JEL classification: D74, H41. 
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"A highway, a bridge, a navigable canal [...] may in most cases be both made
and maintained by a small toll upon the carriages which make use of them. [...] It seems
scarce possible to invent a more equitable way of maintaining such works.\
(Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations.)
Economic integration creates pressures to reduce taxes on mobile tax bases. This
forces governments to either reduce public expenditure or to raise revenue from other
sources. One possibility is to levy higher taxes on immobile bases. Another possibility
is that governments rely more on user-fee ¯nancing. In the literature, the possibility
that ¯scal competition may lead to an increasing tax burden on immobile tax bases
and ine±cient levels of public-goods supply has received a lot of attention 1 whereas
the possibility of more user-fee ¯nancing has been neglected. This may be due to
the fact that standard models of ¯scal competition usually assume that there is a
sharp distinction between private and public goods. Public goods are characterized
by non-excludability, so that user-fee ¯nancing is impossible, whereas those goods
where exclusion is possible can be provided by private markets right away. This view
of the borderline between public and private tasks neglects that, for many public
services, exclusion is possible but costly. These costs may be interpreted as the
costs of using the market mechanism. Highways are a very good example. In some
countries like e.g. Germany, highways are ¯nanced entirely via taxes and everybody
may use them without paying user fees. Currently, though, the government tries to
introduce user fees. In other countries like e.g. Italy or France, user fees are levied
on highways. Of course, user fees require investment in exclusion. Depending on
the exclusion technology and the level of investment, exclusion may or may not be
perfect.
Next to declining tax revenues from mobile bases, there is a second potential
reason to increase user-fee ¯nancing. More economic integration is also likely to
imply that publicly provided services are increasingly consumed by residents of other
1The literaure on capital-tax competition is huge. See Wilson (1999), Janeba and Schjelderup
(2002) and Fuest et al. (2003) for recent surveys.
1jurisdictions. In the presence of spillovers of this kind, user fees o®er a possibility of
partially `exporting' the burden of ¯nancing the service.
It is the purpose of this paper to analyze the e®ect of ¯scal competition on the role
of user-fee ¯nancing. We consider a model of inter-jurisdictional competition where
governments supply a public service to both, domestic residents as well as foreigners.
Governments may levy user fees, but this is possible only if the government spends
resources on exclusion. In this framework, we ask how ¯scal competition a®ects the
choice between tax and user-fee ¯nancing, and we investigate whether uncoordinated
tax and user-fee policies are e±cient for the economy as a whole.
Our analysis leads to the following main results. In a coordinated optimum the
optimal relationship between tax and user-fee ¯nancing of spillover goods is deter-
mined by the comparison between the welfare costs of distortionary taxation and the
costs of using the market mechanism. A market mechanism is extended to the point
where the marginal costs of an increase in exclusion is equal to the marginal bene¯ts
of exclusion. The marginal bene¯ts are determined by the reduction of the distortion
created by taxation. In a world with lump-sum taxation and costless enforcement of
user fees the best way to ¯nance the provision of spillover goods is indeterminate:
user fees act as Lindahl prices, and every combination of tax and user-fee ¯nancing
is ¯rst-best e±cient.
Decentralization of decision making changes this economic rationale in two im-
portant aspects. First, the provision of spillover goods by means of taxation would
be ine±cient even if the tax were non-distortionary. The reason is that even with a
lump-sum tax a national government would not internalize the spillover created by
the supply of the spillover good. Lindahl prices are then a mechanism that induces
the internalization of this externality. Second, the incentive to use user fees changes
compared to a centralized solution. A national authority setting user fees and as-
sociated enforcement policies for foreigners neglects the direct e®ect of an increase
in user fees and enforcement on foreign utility. Hence, it will set the price as to
maximize revenues, not as to internalize externalities. This strategic role of prices is
in con°ict with their potential allocative role to act as Lindahl prices.
Given that there are various externalities between countries, there is a potential
2for welfare-enhancing policy coordination between the two countries. The direc-
tion of this coordination, however, is ambiguous as far as user fees are concerned.
Whether user fees are too high or too low under decentralization depends on whether
domestic and foreign spillover goods are substitutes or complements. This ¯nding
is di®erent from the standard `race to the bottom'-¯nding in the tax-competition
literature. The reason for this di®erence is that the tax-competition literature starts
from the quite natural assumption that from the point of view of capital investors
both countries are substitutes, which creates an incentive to strategically reduce tax
rates. This assumption is no longer natural for the case of di®erent spillover goods.
Highways, for example, can either be substitutes or complements from the point of
view of the users. If they are substitutes the same logic as in the tax-competition
literature explains why user fees are set ine±ciently low. For the case of comple-
mentary spillover goods, however, countries may engage in a race to the top ending
up with ine±ciently high user fees. However, irrespective of the degree of comple-
mentarity, the provision of the spillover good is ine±ciently low whereas exclusion
investments are ine±ciently high in a decentralized equilibrium.
Despite the fact that to our best knowledge competition in user fees has not been
analyzed in the literature so far, our analysis builds on three di®erent strands of the
literature. Our approach is related to the vast literature on tax and more generally
systems competition (Sinn 2003) that focuses on the ine±ciencies of decentralized
decision making in integrated markets. The classic papers in the ¯eld of capital-
tax competition are Bond and Samuelson (1989), Bucovetsky (1991), Bucovetsky
and Wilson (1991), and Wilson (1991). The problem of tax versus fee ¯nancing of
non-rival but excludable public goods is analyzed in Fraser (1996), Brito and Oak-
land (1997), and Janeba and Swope (2001). These papers identify di®erent types of
costs of tax and fee mechanisms depending on the political mechanism, the market
structure, and the ability to discriminate prices. These papers remain in the tradi-
tion that assumes an exogenous distinction between excludable and non-excludable
goods. The idea that exclusion is a costly economic activity is borrowed from the
literature on optimal law enforcement, see for example Clotfelter (1977,78) and the
excellent survey by Polinsky and Shavell (2000) for the case of rival goods, and
3Laux-Mieselbach (1988) for the case of non-rival goods. However, none of these
papers analyzes exclusion and price setting in integrated markets.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. In Section 3
we continue with the analysis of the centralized solution. Section 4 is devoted to the
analysis of decentralized decision making and the analysis of e±ciency-enhancing
policy coordinations. In addition we demonstrate the implications of our model for
the special case of spillover goods that are perfect substitutes. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Economy and governments: We consider a standard static tax-competition
model. An economy is divided into 2 regions, i;j. Together they form a union with
perfectly integrated capital and goods markets. For simplicity we assume that every
region is populated by a representative individual and has a local government that
maximizes the utility of the regional resident. The government provides two goods.
The ¯rst is a local public good whose quantity is denoted by gi. This good only
bene¯ts domestic citizens and exclusion is impossible. The second one is a non-rival
good which has the physical quality to also bene¯t foreigners and for which exclusion
is possible but costly. The quantity of the second good is denoted by ciS. For sim-
plicity the production of the two goods is linear in expenditures. In order to ¯nance
its activities for example region i can use a (source-based) tax on capital income, ti,
and it can levy user fees, pi
i, pi
j, per unit of the spillover good demanded by domestic
and foreign users, ci
iD;ci
jD. Since exclusion with respect to gi is impossible, no user
fees can be levied for gi. Here and in the following, analogous conditions hold and
analogous notation is used for region j.
As mentioned in the introduction, exclusion in our model is a costly activity. If
the government does not invest in exclusion, individuals will free ride on the supply
of the public good ciS, and the government has to rely on capital-tax revenues in
order to ¯nance the good. Investment in exclusion allows it to ¯nance the spillover
goods by means of user fees. We assume that the enforcement of user fees levied
by government i and paid by residents of i and j incurs an (endogenous) cost di
i,
4di
j (defense), for example for the patrolling of police cars on or the installation
of toll booths or electronic toll-collecting systems along the streets. These defensive
investments in°uence the degree of exclusion as follows. Given the investments di
i, di
j




j) the fraction of the total supply of the spillover
good ciP that is successfully defended against free riding. Analogously, (1 ¡ ¼i
i),
(1 ¡ ¼i
j) are is the fractions of the spillover good for which users are successful in
free-riding. The functions ¼i
i;¼i
j represent the technologies of exclusion. It is assumed














i = 1: (1)



















The left-hand side of the equation measures total revenues of the region. They
include capital-tax revenues that are equal to the capital-tax rate times the capital
stock employed in country i, and the total payment of user fees that are equal to the
sum of user-fees times spillover-good demand. The right-hand side of the equation
measures total expenditures of the region. They include the expenditures for the
supply of the spillover good, the expenditures for the enforcement of the user fees
and expenditures for the public good gi.
Individuals: The representative individual in region i derives utility from the con-
sumption of a private good, xi, from consumption of the local public good, gi, and
from the consumption of the spillover goods provided by its region of origin and
the other regions, ciS, cjS. W.l.o.g we assume that the price of the private good is
normalized to be equal to one. The utility functions of the representative individ-
uals are given by ui = u(xi;ci
i;c
j
i;gi) which is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave
and twice continuously di®erentiable in R
++
4 . In the extreme case it may be that
@ui=@c
j




j the total quantity of spillover good i, j consumed by individ-
ual i. (1 ¡ ¼i
i)ci
S, (1 ¡ ¼i
j)c
j
S are the quantities consumed without paying user fees
5(free-rider quantities), and ci
iD, c
j
iD are the quantities consumed with paying user
fees (purchased quantity). Given pro¯t income, P i, given the gross capital-market
interest rate, r, the tax rate, ti, and user fees, pi
i, p
j
i, the budget and consumption
constraints of a resident of region i are
c
i



























The ¯rst two of constraints specify that the total quantity of the public goods
consumed is the sum of the free-rider and the purchased quantity. The left-hand
side of the last constraint is the net-total income of the individual. It is the sum of
the pro¯t income and the net capital income. The right-hand side measures total
expenditures. They are the sum of expenditures for the private and spillover goods.
Firms: Production in each country takes place under conditions of perfect competi-
tion with a strictly concave production function yi = f (ki), which relates output of
the consumption good to the amount of (physical) capital investment, ki. In order
to simplify the analysis we assume that ¯rms in country i are exclusively owned
by resident i and vice versa. The pro¯t income P i is then equal to the pro¯t of a
representative ¯rm in region i, which is equal to
P
i = f(k
i) ¡ (r + t
i)k
i: (4)
Sequence of events: We consider a two-stage game. In the decentralized version of
the model (Section 4), every region non-cooperatively determines its tax rates, de-






subject to the constraints that the government-budget constraint is ful¯lled and that






jD, at stage 1. In
order to characterize the second-best e±cient benchmark we also calculate the solu-
tion of a centralized government that chooses fT i;T jg under the same constraints
at stage 1 (Section 3). A comparison of both solutions allows to identify the types
of externalities existing with decentralized decision making, and thereby the sources
of ine±ciencies.
6Irrespective of the decentralized or centralized solution of stage 1, individuals
maximize their utility by the choice of capital demand, ki, kj, the demand of the







stage 2. The game is solved by backwards induction.
Stage 2: The solution of the individual maximization problem at stage 2 is inde-







































i) ¡ (r + t
i)k
i;
Inserting constraints 2-4 into constraint 1 and the objective function, and denoting
by ¸i the Lagrange multiplier on the remaining constraint, the individual optimum is
characterized by the following ¯rst-order conditions (in order to have a lean notation













i · 0 ^ c
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i · 0 ^ c
i
jD ¸ 0; (7)
k
i : fki(k
i) ¡ (r + t
i) = 0: (8)

















iD > 0 and c
j
iD > 0: user fees are equal to the marginal rate of substitution as
long as the demand for the spillover goods is positive. This property will turn out
to be crucial for an understanding of the solution of the government problem.











































The qualitative results of our analysis hold for general utility functions, However,















In this case, the Envelope theorem allows to calculate the following e®ects:
v
i



































































































































3 Coordinated utility maximization
We start the discussion with the solution to the joint utility-maximization problem
in order to characterize the second-best e±cient policies. This allows us to identify
the source of externalities of a decentralized solution. We assume that a (utilitarian)
centralized planner faces the same instrumental constraints as the regional govern-
ments, and that he maximizes the sum of both regions' indirect utility functions
subject to the two budget constraints. We include the regional budget constraints
as two separate constraints in order to make sure that the optimum is not charac-
terized by inter-regional transfers that would not be replicated by regional planners
because they would be purely redistributive. In addition to the budget constraints,
we have to take into account that private demand for the spillover good cannot ex-







The constraints for country j are analogous.















































































































j are the Lagrange multipliers. After some rearrangements,
the derivatives of the Lagrangean with respect to the policy parameters for country












































































































































































































2If planned demand exceeds supply, a rationing equilibrium arises and realized demand is given
by supply. We ignore rationing equilibria because, if there were rationing, the government can
always reduce exclusion until rationing disappears. A reduction in exclusion, however, reduces the
total quantity of funds necessary, and thereby increases utility. By the same token, a supply of
the spillover good that is smaller than the maximum supply de¯ned by the no-free-rider quantity
¼n
msn
S, m;n = i;j, can never be optimal because the planner can again reduce exclusion and thereby
reduce the total funds necessary.
9where we have used (5) - (8) and (9). The results for the policy variables chosen by
country j are analogous. Note that the Lagrange multipliers have have a straight-
forward economic interpretation: ¹i and ¹j measure the increase in utility resulting
from an exogenous increase in government revenues. They are equal to the marginal







j measure the increase in utility resulting from an exogenous increase in
the supply of the spillover good.
Consider ¯rst the welfare e®ects of spending resources on exclusion. Using 9, and
ui
ic=¸i = pi

















S ¡ 1; (18)
The ¯rst term of equation 18 captures the utility loss for free riders caused by
more exclusion. The second term re°ects that more exclusion investment increases
market demand for the spillover good, which leads to more user fee revenue. The
third term represents the direct costs of increasing exclusion investment. The inter-
pretation of 17 is analogous. Equation 18 shows that, for the economy as a whole,
spending resources on exclusion can only be optimal if the ¯rst-best exceeds the
second-best marginal rate of substitution of the purchased quantity. This is usually
the case if the government has to ¯nance its expenditure via distortionary taxes
and/or exclusion is imperfect.
In this case, it may be socially desirable to exclude agents from free riding because
this induces them to increase their private demand for the good and pay user fees.
In contrast, if a nondistortionary source of ¯nance is available, it is never optimal
to spend resources on exclusion. Given the assumptions of our model, the union as
a whole does have access to such a nondistortionary tax. Since the capital supply to





It follows from (12) that ¸i = ¹i; which re°ects that the capital tax is e®ectively a
lump-sum tax.
10With a lump-sum tax on capital, (16) and (17) imply that it cannot be optimal
to spend resources on exclusion, i.e. di
i = di
j = 0 and ¼i
i , ¼i
j = 0. It immediately
follows that all user fees are zero and that the marginal utility of an exogenous
increase in the supply of the spillover goods, °i








i.e. the supply of the spillover good satis¯es the Samuelson condition. A role for
user fees only arises if taxes are distortionary or exclusion is costless. In the latter
case, the ¯rst-best equilibrium can also be implemented by means of user fees. To
see this, assume for the sake of the argument that ¼i
i(0) = ¼i
j(0) = 1. For ¼i
i = 1 we
get °i
i = uci




In general, however, (15) de¯nes a complicated `modi¯ed' Samuelson condition:
the ¯rst two bracketed terms measure the sum of a composed marginal rate of substi-
tution between spillover and private goods consumption. This composed marginal
rate of substitution consists of the linear combination of (i) the marginal rate of
substitution resulting from free riding and (ii) the marginal rate of substitution
resulting from purchasing. Accordingly, both rates are weighted according to the
corresponding fractions. The third and fourth terms measure the public-revenue ef-
fect resulting from an increase in the production of the spillover good: an increase in
the total quantity will in°uence the demand of the spillover good because it increases
the free-rider quantity. Last not least, the ¯fth e®ect (¡1) measures the marginal
rate of transformation.
The optimal user-fee policy is de¯ned by (13) and (14). An optimal user fee
balances three e®ects. The ¯rst term in (13) and (14) is a measure for the marginal
costs of public funds. It is larger then zero if capital taxes are distortionary and
exclusion is costly in general. If the demand for the spillover goods was constant,
the condition would imply that user fees are increased as long as the marginal costs
of public funds are positive, ¸i < ¹i etc. The second and third e®ect, however,
incorporate the reaction of spillover-goods demand to changes in user fees. These
e®ects are weighted by the deviation between the ¯rst and second best marginal
rate of substitution.
114 Decentralized utility maximization
We now assume that each country sets its policy instruments simultaneously and
non-cooperatively. A decentralized Nash equilibrium is a vector fT iN;T jNg such that
both countries maximize utility given the policy parameters of the other country.







































































































































































































The non-cooperative policy di®ers from the coordinated policy in several ways.
Firstly, capital taxes are no longer considered to be non-distortionary because, given
the level of foreign taxes, an increase in domestic taxes in country i induces a capital
°ow to country j whose welfare e®ects are not internalized by country i. Hence, (21)
implies ¸i¡¹i < 0 for ti > 0. A taxation of capital according to the source principle
12ceteris paribus implies ine±ciently low tax rates in equilibrium. This is the type of
capital-tax competition well known from the literature.
Secondly, user fees and exclusion investments related to foreigners are set to
each region's revenue-maximizing level (equations (23) and (26)). This re°ects that
governments neither internalize the direct e®ect on the utility of foreign citizens nor
the e®ect on foreign revenues when choosing pi
j and di
j.
Thirdly, compared to the situation with an exogenous interregional capital stock
the fact that taxes are distortionary may also induce the government to invest re-
sources in order to exclude of domestic citizens from use of the spillover good (equa-
tion (25)) in order to ¯nance part of the public and spillover good by means of user
fees. It is important to note that the regional incentives to set user fees on domestic
citizens is also diluted by an externality because the associated change in demand
has a revenue e®ect in the foreign region.
Consider ¯nally the condition for the supply of the spillover good, (24). Com-
pared to the centralized solution it follows that the tax-¯nanced free-rider fraction
of the spillover good consumed by foreigners is not internalized in the regional opti-
mization problem. However, the purchased fraction is internalized because the user
fee acts exactly as a mechanism to (imperfectly) internalize the spillover. To make
















i = 0: (27)

























































































It turns out that, despite the possibility of user-fee ¯nancing, the spillover good is
always underprovided relative to the Samuelson quantity. (30) shows that there are
two reasons for this underprovision result. The ¯rst term on the r.h.s. of (30) re°ects
that the marginal source of government revenues is distortionary. This induces the
government to distort the supply of the spillover good. The second term on the
r.h.s. of (30) re°ects that the government of country i does not take into account
the e®ects of providing the spillover good and levying user fees on the utility of
foreign citizens.
4.1 Policy Coordination
The comparison of ¯rst-order conditions of the centralized and the decentralized
problem has revealed a complex structure of externalities present in decentralized
decision making. Hence, it cannot be expected that the decentralized solution will
turn out to be optimal. In order to prove this conjecture and to understand the
deviation of the decentralized solution from the centralized one we consider four
types of coordinated policy changes in this section,
1. a coordinated marginal increase in the user fee paid by domestic citizens,
2. a coordinated marginal increase in the user fee paid by foreign citizens,
3. a coordinated marginal increase in the exclusion investment directed against
foreign free riders,
4. a coordinated marginal increase in the supply of the spillover good.
In all these cases, we assume that the coordination departs from the equilibrium
without coordination and that investments in exclusion and user fees are positive
in the decentralized equilibrium but that exclusion is not perfect. Moreover, the
government budget constraint is balanced by adjusting the supply of g.
141. Coordination of user fees paid by domestic citizens.




































We may thus state
Result 1: If the foreign spillover good is a substitute (complement) for
the domestic good, @ci
jD=@p
j
j > (<) 0, a coordinated increase in user fees
for domestic citizens increases (reduces) welfare.
Result 1 shows that the strategic incentives for setting user fees on foreigners are
determined by the degree of complementarity/substitutability between both regions'
spillover goods. An increase in the user fee paid by domestic citizens creates a
¯scal externality because demand for the domestic and the foreign spillover goods
is interdependent. If the goods are substitutes, the increase in the fee for domestic
users induces them to increase their demand for the foreign spillover good, which
increases user-fee revenues abroad and therefore raises welfare abroad. The analogy
to the capital tax competition literature is obvious. Under the source principle an
increase in the tax rate in one region creates a positive externality in the other
regions because the reallocation of capital increases foreign tax bases. The problem
of tax competition is increasing in the elasticity of capital supply. With user fees
the problem is similar if the goods are substitutes. If the goods are complements,
however, the externality caused by an increase in user fees is negative because an
increase in foreign prices is partly compensated by a decrease in domestic demand.
This reduces foreign revenues, and foreign welfare is negatively a®ected.
2. Coordination of user fees paid by foreign citizens.
The intuition given in the last paragraph should in principle also apply for the
case of user fees paid by foreign citizens. However, the problem is di®erent because
15contrary to the case of domestic user fees the foreign direct utility e®ect of an increase
in foreign user fees is not internalized by the domestic government.
The welfare e®ect of a coordinated change in pi
j, p
j
















In the equilibrium without coordination, we have @Lid
@pi
j = 0, so that the welfare e®ect







































We may thus state:
Result 2:




0, a coordinated increase of the user fee on foreigners reduces welfare.




a coordinated increase of the user fee on foreigners may increase or decrease
welfare.
Surprisingly, despite the fact that the domestic government neglects any direct e®ect
on utility (and thereby maximizes revenues when setting user fees) it turns out that
a coordinated increase of the user fee for foreign users does not necessarily decrease
welfare. This happens because an increase in foreign user fees may raise domestic
private demand for the domestic spillover good. The increase in user-fee revenue
may increase domestic welfare. If the price elasticity is su±ciently large this revenue
e®ect dominates.
163. Coordination of exclusion investments directed against foreign free
riders.
















We may thus state
Result 3: A coordinated reduction in exclusion investment against for-
eign free riders increases welfare.
Result 3 is intuitive. Acting individually rational, regions take into account the
bene¯t from excluding foreigners from the consumption of the domestic spillover
good but they do not take into account the costs imposed on foreigners.
There are no e®ects of changes in investments in exclusion on demand for spillover
goods in the other countries. One should note that this property of demand func-
tions is due to the preference structure we have assumed. For more general utility
functions, changes in the investments in exclusion will again a®ect demand for the
spillover goods and will, therefore, give rise to ¯scal externalities similar to those
discussed in the context of Results 1 and 2.
In a world where user fees can be perfectly enforced without any costs the use
of the market mechanism has two very attractive properties. First, the fact that all
potential users pay for the use of the goods solves the incentive problem present
when the regions non-cooperatively decide how much of the spillover good is to
be produced. The fact that user prices re°ect marginal rates of substitutions im-
plies that a decentralized planner acts as if he internalizes the utility of the total
population. The incentive problem cannot be solved by the use of traditional tax
mechanisms because even if foreigners pay domestic taxes their marginal utility of
the spillover good would still be neglected in the decentralized decision problem.
Second, user fees are appealing because every individual (and thereby every region)
pays according to its valuation of the good (principle of correspondence). Tax ¯nanc-
17ing without exclusion may imply de-facto interregional subsidies that may provoke
political opposition. Hence there cannot be `too much market' if markets are free.
In a world with costly exclusion, however, user fees lose some of their attractive
features. There can and will be `too much market' if regions invest in exclusion non-
cooperatively. From the centralized point of view it is rational to allow for a degree
of free riding by foreigners that exceeds the decentralized one, which breaks the
principle of correspondence. The implied dilution of regional incentives to produce
the spillover good is more then compensated by the implied reduction in the costs
of exclusion.
4. Coordination in the supply of the spillover good.
Finally consider a coordinated change in the supply of the spillover good, holding













Result 4 follows immediately:
Result 4: A coordinated increase in the supply of the spillover good
increases welfare.
The result is a consequence of the positive externality created by regional in-
vestments in the spillover good. Prima facie, every region neglects the direct utility
e®ect caused by its supply decision in the other region. Part of this externality is
internalized by the (endogenously established) price mechanism. However, because
the price mechanism is imperfect there remains a positive externality in equilibrium.
4.2 Perfect substitutes
In this section we will focus on the extreme case where the two spillover goods are
perfect substitutes that has been excluded from our analysis so far. This case allows
it to understand the strategic incentives present in the decentralized solution in a
very stylized way.





m(:) is strictly concave.3

















can be an equilibrium of the decentralized game: assume w.l.o.g. that p
j
j > 0. In




j, indeterminate for pi
j = p
j
j, and equal to ci




is discontinuous at pi
j = p
j
j. In order to maximize revenues from foreign consumption
(equation (23)) it is always rational to set pi
j = p
j
j ¡ ², ² > 0, ² ! 0. By the same
token it is evident that country j's optimal reaction is to undercut every positive
price of the other country as well, because otherwise its revenues would be zero
anyway.4
Given that user fees are equal to zero irrespective of the other policy variables,
it follows immediately that the optimal investments in defense, (25) and (26), are
equal to zero as well: the only reason to exclude consumers from free riding is to
raise revenues for the ¯nancing of the spillover good. If this is not possible it makes
no sense to waste resources on exclusion.
Result 5: If both spillover goods are perfect substitutes there will be
no exclusion in the decentralized equilibrium and the user fees will all
be equal to zero.
There is again a close analogy between Result 5 and the literature on capital-
tax competition: If the source principle applies, capital-tax competition between two
small countries drives capital taxes to zero because of the in¯nite elasticity of capital
supply. If the spillover goods are perfect substitutes the elasticity of demand is also
in¯nite, implying that small di®erences in user fees induce a complete interregional
reallocation of demand.





4Zero user fees play the role of the \price equals marginal costs" rule in the Bertrand oligopoly
model.
195 Conclusions
This paper has set a framework for thinking about the relationship between tax
and user-fee ¯nancing of decentrally provided spillover goods. We have shown that
decentralized policies cause a number of externalities that lead to over-investment
in exclusion and the strategic setting of fees. Hence, economic integration is likely to
cause problems for price mechanisms which are similar to those faced by tax mech-
anisms. A shift towards user-fee ¯nancing of publicly provided goods is therefore no
way out of the problem of tax competition. However, countries engaging in user-fee
competition may end up with ine±ciently low or ine±ciently high levels of user fees,
depending on whether the spillover goods are substitutes or complements.
Given the recent trend towards user fees in many countries, our ¯ndings have
important policy implications. First of all it cannot be expected that regions have
an incentive to e±ciently invest in exclusion technologies. On the contrary it can
be expected that `over-enforcement' will occur, that there is `too much market'
in equilibrium because regional governments neglect the foreign free-rider utility.
Second, it cannot be expected that regional governments set user-fees e±ciently.
If the spillover goods are substitutes our analysis predicts that countries will
engage in a race to the bottom because an increase (reduction) in user fees creates
a positive (negative) externality in the other region. Hence, countries can increase
their user-fee revenues by lowering their user fees and thereby attracting foreign
users. Examples for spillover goods that are substitutes are university education,
where di®erent regions compete for students, state-owned national parks, museums,
or concert halls, were di®erent regions compete for tourists or visitors, or regions
that are located to each other such that the user can choose between both road
systems when travelling from A to B.
If the spillover goods are complements our analysis predicts that countries will
engage in a race to the top. An increase (decrease) in the user fee creates a negative
(positive) externality in the other region because any reduction in the domestic
demand for spillover goods is accompanied by a reduction in the demand for foreign
spillover goods. As a consequence user fees tend to be ine±ciently high. The highway
20systems of two regions a user has to cross when travelling from A to B is an example
for this case.
Our analysis suggests that the decentralized setting of user fees is likely to be
ine±cient. The implication of this ¯nding is, however, not that political responsibil-
ities for user fees have to be centralized. It is an important lesson from the theory of
tax competition that ine±ciencies of decentralized decision making depend on the
tax principles applied. It is not the decentralized responsibility for taxation but the
source principle that causes the problem. A switch towards a destination principle
would eliminate any strategic incentive as long as households are immobile and a
system of information exchange can be established. The same logic applies to the
case of user-fee competition. In this paper we have implicitly assumed that a `des-
tination' principle applies in the sense that users have to pay fees according to the
principles of the country who provides the good. This principle creates strategic
incentives because, e.g. in the case of substitutes individuals can avoid high fees by
using the spillover good of an alternative country. Switching towards a `national-
ity' principle where the regional government sets user fees for its residents for all
competing spillover goods eliminates strategic incentives if the regions commit to
a system of information exchange about the foreign use of spillover goods. In this
case regional governments have no incentive to engage in user-fee competition be-
cause increasing or lowering fees does not create an externality in the other region.
However, despite the fact that this system eliminates strategic incentives in setting
user fees, it does not eliminate the problem of underprovision of the spillover good
as long as it is not accompanied by a system of inter-regional transfers.
There are a number of interesting extensions to our analysis, and we will brie°y
discuss two of them. First, our analysis has assumed that user fees can be set as to
discriminate between domestic and foreign users. This may be a realistic assump-
tion for some goods (tuition fees usually discriminate between domestic and foreign
students), but for practical or principle reasons not so realistic for other goods. For
example entrance fees to national parks, museums or concert halls usually do not
di®erentiate according to nationality. The European Union Directive 99/62/EC ex-
plicitly prohibits discrimination for the case of road pricing. However, the principle
21structure of externalities would remain intact if the governments had to set a uni-
form user fee because national authorities would still fail to internalize the direct
e®ect of their policies on foreign welfare. Hence, the voluntary co-operation of Bel-
gium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden to introduce a common
system of user fees (the so called `Eurovignette') may be a means to overcome the
ine±ciencies of a decentralized solution.5
Second we have abstracted from another important reason why user-fee ¯nancing
has become popular in the last couple of years. It is not only a means to raise
government revenues but also a means to internalize externalities if the spillover
goods su®er from congestion. The incentive e®ect of time-dependent highway-toll
systems in metropolitan areas like Singapore or London is at least as important as
the revenue e®ect. It is unclear how our results carry over to the case of spillover
goods with congestion but we think that the strategic e®ects isolated by the analysis
of the present paper should have an in°uence on the incentives to set user fees in
case of congestion.
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